

## ナイジェリア

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1. 一般情報

(1) 地理・人口

ア オーストラリア外務貿易省 (DFAT) 「[出身国情報報告 ナイジェリア \(仮訳\)](#)」  
(2018 年 3 月 9 日)

2.8 ナイジェリアには、500 の現地語を持つおよそ 200 の民族集団が居住している。最大の民族集団は北西部に住むハウサ/フラニ族 (Hausa-Fulani)、北東部に住むカヌリ族 (Kanuri) 南東部に住むイボ族 (Igbo) 及び南西部に住む Yoruba 族 (Yoruba) である。南部中央部及び北部中央部には、多数の小規模な民族集団が全域に散らばって居住している。公用語は英語であるが、ハウサ語、Yoruba 語、イボ語を含む複数の現地語も用いられている。ピジン語は共通語である。

2.9 ナイジェリア人のおよそ 50 パーセントはイスラム教徒、40 パーセントがキリスト教、10 パーセントが土着の宗教的信仰に従っている人々である。イスラム教徒の主要な集団はスンニ派であるが、ナイジェリアにはシーア派やイザラ派 (サラフィスト) の少数派もいる。キリスト教団体には、ローマカトリック、英国国教会、バプティスト、メソジスト、長老派教会、福音主義派、ペンテコステ派及び末日聖徒イエスキリスト教会 (モルモン教) が含まれる。キリスト教は南部諸州における多数派の宗教であり、イスラム教は北部諸州における多数派の宗教となっている。英国はナイジェリア南部を直接支配し、キリスト教への大々的な改宗活動を推進した。これとは対照的に、植民地政府は北部でイスラム教徒の首長を介した間接的統治の方針を適用した。北部ではキリスト教と西洋教育がそれほど広まっておらず、著しい文化的差異を生みだしている。この文化的差異は今日までナイジェ

リア社会の大きな特徴となっている。

イ ●英国内務省「[出身国情報及びガイダンス ナイジェリア: 国内移住、第 1.0 版](#)」(2019 年 3 月)

**3.3 Ethnicity**

3.3.1 The EASO socio-economic report of 2018, citing various sources, stated: ‘Nigeria is a highly diverse country with regards to ethnic groups and languages. There are more than 250 ethnic groups of which the largest groups are: Hausa/Fulani 29 %, Yoruba 21 %, Igbo (Ibo) 18 %, Ijaw 10 %, Kanuri 4 %, Ibibio 3.5 %, Tiv 2.5 %, Edo/Bini 2%. The main languages (of the 519 living languages in the country) spoken include English, PidginEnglish, Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, Ijaw.[...]

(2) 内政

ア 外務省海外安全ホームページ「[ナイジェリア 安全対策基礎データ](#)」(2017 年 8 月 16 日)

1 ナイジェリアには、言語、宗教、風俗を異にする約 250 の民族グループがありますが、中でもハウサ・フラニ人(50%程度)、ヨルバ人(18%程度)、イボ人(11%程度)が全人口の 3 分の 2 を占めています。

2 1960 年の英連邦からの独立以来 7 回も軍事クーデターが発生しています。こうした政情不安の背景には、地域・民族間対立(北部ハウサ・フラニ人、南西部ヨルバ人、南東部イボ人)、宗教対立(北部イスラム教徒と南部キリスト教徒)、石油資源の利益を巡る争い(南東部)等が影響しています。

イ 外務省「[基礎データ：ナイジェリア連邦共和国](#)」(2019 年 2 月 12 日)

2015 年 3 月、国民議会選挙、大統領選挙が実施され、最大野党 APC 候補であるブハリ元国家元首が、大統領に選出された。また国民議会選挙においても、APC が上院、下院ともに過半数を占め、ナイジェリア史上初めて、民主的手続きによって政権交代が実現した。ブハリ大統領は、ボコ・ハラム対策を始めとした治安対策や汚職対策を優先的に推進している。また、昨今の原油価格下落に伴い、ナイジェリア経済が悪化しており、産業多角化を始めとした経済対策が喫緊の課題となっている。

(3) ビアフラ共和国

ア 在ナイジェリア日本国大使館「[ナイジェリア大使館からの注意喚起\(ビアフラ関係\)](#)」(2017 年 9 月 27 日)

※参考：ビアフラ共和国(1967 年 5 月 30 日～1970 年 1 月 11 日)は、今年、独

立宣言された 1967 年から 50 周年を迎える。首都は当初エヌグ市（現エヌグ州エヌグ市）であったが、その後、オウエリ市（現イモ州オウエリ市）に移動。ビアフラ戦争は 1967 年 7 月 6 日～1970 年 1 月 11 日に発生。

## 2. 人権状況

### (1) 北部地域の人権状況

#### ア UNHCR「[ナイジェリア北東部（ボルノ州・ヨベ州・アダマワ州）および周辺地域から避難する人々の国際保護の必要性について 更新Ⅱ（仮訳）](#)」（2016 年 10 月）

1. 本稿は、2014 年 10 月に発行された UNHCR の「ナイジェリア北東部から避難する人々の国際保護の必要性について（更新Ⅰ）」を更新し、それに取って代わるものである<sup>1</sup>。それ以降も、暴力は同地域における市民に影響を与え続けている<sup>2</sup>。反政府勢力に対する軍事作戦によって、ナイジェリア北東部、特にボルノ州の多くの地方自治政府の地域（LGAs）が政府の支配下に取り戻されたが、治安悪化とで長期化する戦闘が一般市民の避難を引き起こし続けている<sup>3</sup>。反政府勢力の軍事能力は弱まったと報告されているが、ナイジェリア国内およびその隣国のカメルーン、チャド、ニジェールにおいて、一般市民に対する無差別攻撃が続いている<sup>4</sup>。2016 年 1 月から 5 月にかけて、主にボルノ州およびアダマワ州における紛争に関連した暴力の結果、一般市民 386 名が死亡したと報じられている<sup>5</sup>。

…

12. ナイジェリア北東部、特にアダマワ州、ボルノ州、ヨベ州、における状況が流動的であり不安定であることから、UNHCR は隣国に対し、国境を閉ざさず、安全を求め危機から逃れてくる人々の領域へのアクセスおよび庇護手続きへのアクセスを許可するよう要請する。UNHCR は、ナイジェリア北東部から避難している人々、ならびにナイジェリア北東部で暴力が激化する以前にすでに庇護国に滞在していた人々は、1969 年 OAU 条約第 1 条 2 項に基づき国際保護を必要としている可能性が高いと考える<sup>40</sup>。加えて、ナイジェリア北東部から避難している人々の多くは 1951 年条約に規定される難民の地位の基準を満たす可能性がある<sup>41</sup>。UNHCR は、治安および人権状況が相当に改善されるまでは、庇護の申立てが不認定とされた者も含めて、ナイジェリアのこれらの地域への国民または常居者の強制帰還を停止するよう各国に求める。…

#### イ 玉井隆「[時事解説：2015 年ナイジェリア選挙](#)」ジェトロ・アジア経済研究所『アフリカレポート』53 号（2015 年）

前回 2011 年の国政選挙では、敗北したブハリ（北部出身 2・イスラーム教）の支持者が主にキリスト教徒を襲撃し、800 人以上の死者を出した。この暴動はブハリが北部のイスラーム教徒の若者を煽動したとされ、今回の選挙においてもこうした混乱や騒動が危惧された。しかし結果としては、確かに多くのトラブルがあっ

たが、その規模は小さかった。…

## (2) 南東部地域の人権状況

### ア ●マイノリティ・ライツ・グループ・インターナショナル (MRGI) [「マイノリティ/先住民世界要覧 - ナイジェリア:イボ族」](#) (2018 年 1 月)

Secessionist sentiments among Igbo have persisted, despite the government's crackdown. Following President Buhari's election in 2015, demonstrations by pro-independence protestors were met with harsh measures by the security forces, with scores of demonstrators reportedly killed and some activists arrested. The leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) group, Nnamdi Kanu, was charged with conspiracy and treasonable felony along with three other men. A number of the charges were struck by the judge in March 2017, and Kanu was released on bail in May 2017.

While Boko Haram activity in the north-east continued to garner most attention, a number of experts highlighted the significance of the re-activation of the pro-independence movement in the south-east. Aside from the reported deaths and numerous arrests of protestors by the authorities, hostility also grew amongst some segments of the population elsewhere in the country. In June 2017, activists in the northern city of Kaduna called for the eviction of Igbo residing in the state. Arrest warrants were issued for the protest leaders.

## (3) デルタ地域の人権状況

### ア ●マイノリティ・ライツ・グループ・インターナショナル (MRGI) [「マイノリティ/先住民世界要覧 - ナイジェリア:デルタ地域のマイノリティ集団」](#) (2018 年 1 月)

The easy availability of small arms in the region made the situation more serious. Security forces in the Delta region regularly engaged in torture, killings and confiscation of property. At the same time, the region was characterized by increasing insecurity, including attacks by militants on oil installations in early 2006. In April, President Olusegun Obasanjo proposed a 'Marshall Plan' for the Delta, but only with involvement of corrupt local officials and exclusion of many civil society organisations that enjoy credibility in the region. Following further attacks, in August 2006 Obasanjo ordered a crackdown on militants while still pursuing negotiations. Kidnappings of local and international oil workers also rose steadily, with the militias even resorting to the kidnapping of children. The grip of the militants on the area was illustrated in August 2007, when fighting rocked Port Harcourt -- Nigeria's main oil city. There were running battles in the street after government troops tried to arrest a prominent Delta militia leader. Criminality is alleged on the side of the military too -- with accusations that local military officials are involved with much of the oil sold to Eastern Europe in exchange for weapons.

The long-running dispute between local communities and Shell in the Niger Delta ended

on 4 June 2008, when the Nigerian government took a decision to replace Shell as operator of oil concessions in Ogoni areas. …

### 3. 関連する政治組織等、政治活動／政府批判（労働運動含む）の取扱い

#### (1) イボ地域の政治組織

##### ① ビアフラ主権国家実現のための運動（MASSOB）

ア ●英国内務省「[国別情報ノート ナイジェリア：ビアフラ分離主義者、1.0 版](#)」（2020 年 4 月）

2.4.5 The Biafran cause of secession endures, driven by a sense of unfair treatment and marginalisation which led to the formation of new independence movements. In South East Nigeria there are several groups aiming for secession. The two main groups are the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), founded in 1999 whose members were drawn from the Biafran Igbo-dominated states. In recent years MASSOB has fractured into several factions and splinter groups (see Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) leadership, size and structure).

イ ●アムネスティ・インターナショナル「[NIGERIA: SECURITY FORCES MUST AVOID REPRESSION OF BIAFRA DAY PROTESTS](#)」（2017 年 5 月 30 日）

During peaceful Biafra Day celebrations last year in Onitsha, Anambra State, soldiers shot people in several locations. Amnesty International research concluded that at least 60 extra-judicial executions were committed in the space of two days, with a further 70 people injured. The real number is likely to be higher.

…

The security forces have already started clamping down on pro-Biafra groups ahead of the formal anniversary. On 22 May 2017, more than 100 members of **the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)** and Biafra Independent Movement (BIM) were arrested in Enugu, Ebonyi, and Cross Rivers states during similar celebrations.

ウ ●ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ「[ワールドレポート 2017—ナイジェリア](#)」（2017 年 1 月 12 日）

In February and May, security forces were accused of killing at least 40 members of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), and **Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)**. The groups are advocating for the separation of Biafra – mainly made up of Igbo-speaking people in the southeast – and the release of Nnamdi Kanu, the IPOB leader detained and undergoing trial for treason since October 2015.

[下記\(3\)ク](#)と同じ文書



- エ ●カナダ移民難民局 (IRBC) 「[\(クエリー回答\) Nigeria: Situation and treatment of members of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra \(MASSOB\), including arrest and prosecution; whether the Nigeria Police Force pursue people who use bribes to flee detention and who have no charges against them \(2013-July 2016\)](#)」 (2016 年 7 月 20 日)

## 2. Treatment by Authorities

International Crisis Group states that in 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan listed MASSOB as an "extremist group' threatening Nigeria's security" (4 Dec. 2015). According to sources, in a March 2016 interview, the Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari told Al-Jazeera that agitation for Biafra independence in Nigeria would not be tolerated (Vanguard 6 Mar. 2016; Newsweek 7 Mar. 2016). International Crisis Group also reports that the chief of the Nigerian Army "vowed to 'crush' any threat to the country's unity and territorial integrity" (4 Dec. 2015). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to the Senior Lecturer, arrests of MASSOB and other pro-Biafra activists are "rampant" in Nigeria, adding that "[a]ny time [MASSOB] planned to engage in rallies, marches, commemoration and other activities, [they] often result in clashes with security operatives ending up in the arrest and detention of MASSOB members" (Senior Lecturer 15 July 2016).

### 2.1 Incidents of Arrests and Violence

According to an article by a Nigerian news website 247 Nigeria News Update, in 2013, when numerous corpses appeared in the Ezu River in Anambra State, MASSOB alleged that their members had been killed and dumped by Nigerian security forces (247 Nigeria News Update [2013]). The Senior Lecturer similarly stated that when approximately 30 bodies were discovered in the river, "MASSOB claimed [they] were their members, arrested and detained by Nigerian security operatives, but never prosecuted for any offences" (Senior Lecturer 15 July 2016). 247 Nigeria News Update indicates that a Senate Committee report that examined the case could not establish the identities of the 19 victims or the perpetrators (247 Nigeria News Update [2013]).

Sources report that in September 2015, 50 Uwazuruike-led MASSOB members were arrested when police stormed Uwazuruike's house in Imo State (Daily Post 7 Sept. 2015; Senior Lecturer 15 July 2016).

According to the US Department of State's Overseas Security Advisory Council's (OSAC) 2016 Crime and Safety Report for Nigeria, in 2015, members of IPOB and MASSOB held "several protests" in Nigeria (US 15 Apr. 2016, 4). The report states that "[t]he protests mainly centered on the arrest of the groups' leadership as well as their

dissatisfaction with perceived inequality against the Igbo community" (ibid.). Sources indicate that the demonstrations began after Nigerian authorities arrested IPOB's leader Nnamdi Kanu (International Crisis Group 4 Dec. 2015; Senior Lecturer 15 July 2015) in October 2015, whom Madu's **MASSOB** faction supports (ibid.). According to the International Crisis Group, the protests involved "over 10,000 people in some cities" (4 Dec. 2015).

...

② ビアフラ先住人 (IPOB)

ア ●英国内務省「[国別情報ノート ナイジェリア：ビアフラ分離主義者、1.0 版](#)」  
(2020 年 4 月)

2.4.6 The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) grew out of MASSOB between 2012 and 2014 and reportedly has a presence in and outside of Nigeria. There are also a number of minor Biafran groups, but they do not seem to have a significant presence. Both MASSOB and IPOB have largely advocated for peaceful change but on occasions have used rhetoric that may encourage violent resistance (see Overview of groups).

...

2.4.9 IPOB has in recent years become the dominant Biafran group. Since 2015 the security forces have reportedly killed 10s and arrested 100s of IPOB supporters, usually when disrupting demonstrations or marches to promote Biafran independence, particularly during 2015 to 2017. Also a number of IPOB senior members have been arrested, including the IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu who was jailed for 2 years and then subsequently released and is reported to have left the country. Following the ban of IPOB in 2017, when all its activities were declared illegal, 100s of supporters of IPOB (but also some members of other pro-Biafran groups) who have attended protests and processions have been arrested and detained. There have also been a few reports of persons who publicly display Biafran independence through flags and other insignia being arrested (see Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) leaders, size and structure, Break-up of / use of excessive force against demonstrations and Killings, discriminations, violence and harassment).

イ ●IRBC「[IRBC クエリー回答 \[NGA106308.E\]：IPOB の目的・組織・活動、構成員の当局による取扱い \(2017 年～2019 年 5 月\)](#)」(2019 年 6 月 28 日)

**1. Overview**

Sources state the IPOB is a group seeking to form an independent Biafra state (Amnesty International 24 Nov. 2016, 11; Campbell 21 Mar. 2018; BBC 5 May 2017). A report by Amnesty International on the repression of pro-Biafra activists indicates IPOB was formed in 2012 (Amnesty International 24 Nov. 2016, 11), while other sources state IPOB was



formed in 2014 (BBC 5 May 2017; Turnbull Aug. 2017, 30). According to sources, an attempt to declare an independent Biafra in 1967 led to a civil war, resulting in approximately one million dead, and the secessionists defeated (Campbell 21 Mar. 2018; BBC 5 May 2017).

...

### **3. Activities**

#### **3.1 Radio Biafra**

Various sources state Radio Biafra broadcasts from London (Amnesty International 24 Nov. 2016, 5; Tayo and Mbah 9 Nov. 2017; BBC 5 May 2017). However, a Los Angeles Times (LA Times) article published in April 2019 indicates the broadcasts are conducted live from an undisclosed location in Nigeria (LA Times 30 Apr. 2019). Tayo and Mbah state the daily broadcasts are in English and in Igbo (Tayo and Mbah 9 Nov. 2017). Sources further indicate broadcasts on IPOB's Radio Biafra are used to advocate for an independent Biafra (Turnbull Aug. 2017, 30; BBC 5 May 2017; LA Times 30 Apr. 2019)....

...

#### **3.2 Protests and Boycotts**

Sources indicate the IPOB and other pro-Biafra groups, including Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) (The Guardian 31 May 2017) issued a "sit-at-home" order for 30 May 2017 (Vanguard 30 May 2017; The Guardian 31 May 2017).

The IPOB issued another "sit-at-home" order for 30 May 2018 (Premium Times 30 May 2018; Vanguard 30 May 2018)....

According to sources, the IPOB again issued a "sit-at-home" order for 30 May 2019 (Vanguard 31 May 2019; Premium Times 30 May 2019; The Guardian 30 May 2019)....

Sources indicate that the IPOB called for the boycott of the February 2019 general election (Foreign Policy 15 Feb. 2019; AFP 17 Feb. 2019)....

...

### **5. Treatment by Authorities**

Sources indicate the Nigerian military launched "Operation Python Dance II" that started on 15 September 2017 and was set to last until 15 October 2017 in the South East region to tackle crime (Daily Trust 24 Sept. 2017; Vanguard 17 Sept. 2017). According to a statement from the Nigerian army, quoted in a Vanguard article, the operation "is not targeted at any individual or group" (Vanguard 17 Sept. 2017). Sources state the military raided Nnamdi Kanu's home as part of the operation (Tayo and Mbah 9 Nov. 2017; Reuters 3 Oct. 2017). Sources indicate that the IPOB stated that approximately twenty IPOB members were shot dead during the raid, while the military denied the raid took place (Reuters 3 Oct. 2017; Newsweek 17 Oct. 2017). In contrast, Amnesty International states that ten IPOB members were killed and twelve injured by the military, and the military

noted the deaths occurred during their attempt to arrest Kanu at his home (Amnesty International 22 Feb. 2018). Sources indicate the following information:...

Sources indicate that the Nigerian military designated the IPOB as a terrorist organization in September 2017, citing the IPOB's formation of the BSS and attacks on security forces as reasons (Reuters 15 Sept. 2017; VOA 26 Sept. 2017). Sources indicate the label of "terrorist" organization has been rejected by international observers (Human Rights Watch 17 Jan. 2019; Tayo and Mbah 9 Nov. 2017). According to sources, five South Eastern States in Nigeria, including Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo, banned all IPOB activities (Pulse.ng 15 Sept. 2017; Channel Television 15 Sept. 2017). Sources indicate that the Abia State Police Commissioner stated, subsequent to the terrorist designation and the ban on IPOB activities, that anyone caught with "Biafran materials would be arrested and prosecuted" (NAN 17 Sept. 2017; Vanguard 18 Sept. 2017). The Anambra Police Commissioner, quoted by the Punch, a Nigerian news publication, indicated the ban would be enforced and anyone involved in the activities of the IPOB would be charged with terrorism, which carries a minimum sentence of twenty years and a maximum sentence of the death penalty (The Punch 19 Sept. 2017).

...

ウ ●アムネスティ・インターナショナル「[年次報告 2017 年／2018 年—ナイジェリア](#)」(2018 年 2 月 22 日)

In May, a high court ordered the SSS to release Bright Chimezie, a member of **the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)**. Instead, the SSS included his name in another case. Bright Chimezie had not been brought to court by the end of the year; the SSS had held him in incommunicado detention for more than one year.

エ ●ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ「[ワールドレポート 2018—ナイジェリア](#)」(2018 年 1 月 18 日)

In April, Nnamdi Kanu, leader of the separatist **Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)** was released from detention on the orders of a court. He was arrested in October 2015 and detained on treason charges. In response to calls for Igbo independence by IPOB, in June a northern-interest pressure group, the Arewa Youth Consultative Forum (AYCF), issued a notice demanding that Igbos leave northern Nigeria before October 1, or face "visible actions." Following condemnation by various interlocutors, including UN independent experts, the AYCF withdrew the quit notice in late August.

オ ●記事「[Tension grips Nigerian city as separatist leader goes missing](#)」ロイター通信 (2017 年 10 月 3 日)

A secessionist leader seeking independence from Nigeria has been missing since an alleged military raid more than two weeks ago left his house in the city of Umuahia riddled with bullet holes, its windows smashed and doors hanging off hinges.

...

“They were shooting everything they saw,” he said, pointing to bullet holes in walls and windows.

“They came here just to kill everybody,” he said, adding that around 20 IPOB members were shot dead but most of the bodies were taken by soldiers.

Reuters witnesses - a reporter and TV cameraman - on Sept. 27 saw six corpses with bullet wounds in a morgue, who IPOB said were among their members.

...

“The military did not raid Nnamdi Kanu’s residence,” a military spokesman told reporters in the capital, Abuja. “Nnamdi Kanu is not in the custody of the military.”

カ ●記事「[Nnamdi Kanu and the Indigenous People of Biafra](#)」 Council on Foreign Relations (2017 年 9 月 28 日)

The government of Nigeria has formally labeled the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) a terrorist organization. Following a September 14 military attack on his house in Umuahia, the capital of Abia state, the organization’s leader Nnamdi Kanu is nowhere to be found. Kanu’s lawyer maintains that government security services are holding him and members of his family in secret, including his father Eze Israel Kanu, a traditional ruler, and his mother. Government spokesmen are maintaining that Kanu, who has been under house arrest and is facing charges of treason, has jumped bail. According to the Nigerian media, there is speculation that Kanu is dead, killed by the security forces.

IPOB agitates for Biafran independence, but asserts that it is non-violent. In 2015, Kanu was arrested and charged with treason. After some eighteen months, he was released, apparently to house arrest, pending his trial, which is scheduled to take place in the next few weeks. Kanu’s lawyer is insisting that the security services are holding him and therefore must present him at the trial....

キ 在ナイジェリア日本国大使館「[ナイジェリア大使館からの注意喚起（ビアフラ関係）](#)」 (2017 年 9 月 27 日)

1 英国からのブハリ大統領帰国後の 8 月 20 日頃、ナイジェリア軍及び治安機関との会議で IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra。ビアフラ独立を主張するイボ族による政治団体) をボコ・ハラム等と並ぶ脅威とし、対策の強化を指示しました。

その後、ナイジェリア軍は、対 IPOB 向けに南東部、南南部において、

Operation Python DanceII（巡回、警備実施等の治安維持主体の作戦との由であるが、詳細は不明）を開始し、現在も実施中です。

…

3 9月15日、ナイジェリア軍は、秘密の軍事組織の発足、違法な道路封鎖、火焰瓶等の使用、巡回・警備中の軍部隊に対する物理的対立、軍からの武器の奪取の試み等を理由に IPOB をテロ組織と宣告しました。それに対し、IPOB 指導者、ンナムディ・カヌ（Nnamudi Kanu）は、同組織は非暴力的なものであると主張し、法的対決を宣言しました

4 その後、9月17日、ブハリ大統領は IPOB に対し、組織活動の禁止に関する大統領布告を発出し、右を受け、9月20日、連邦高裁は IPOB をテロ組織に指定して、組織活動の禁止を発令しました。

ク ●記事「[Security forces, pro-Biafra group clash in Nigeria](#)」AFP（2017年9月15日）

Tensions mounted between Nigerian security forces and pro-Biafra supporters on Thursday, after renewed protests calling for independence and clashes targeting police.

In Port Harcourt, the capital of the southern state of Rivers, 32 people were arrested after two days of demonstrations and the death of one police officer.

In neighbouring Abia state, supporters of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) group targeted police in the commercial hub, Aba, and the capital, Umuahia.

The IPOB is demanding a separate state for the Igbo people who are the most populous ethnic group in Nigeria's southeast. Fifty years ago, a declaration of Biafran independence sparked a brutal 30-month civil war.

In the latest violence, police vehicles were seen with smashed windscreens and officers fired warning shots, while there were reports of petrol bombs thrown and bonfires set to restrict movement.

A police station in Aba was burnt down on Thursday, said state police spokesman Geoffrey Ogonna.

ケ ●アムネスティ・インターナショナル「[年次報告 2016/2017 年—ナイジェリア](#)」（2017年2月22日）

UNLAWFUL KILLINGS

The military was deployed in 30 out of Nigeria's 36 states and in the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja where they performed routine policing functions including responding to non-violent demonstrations. The military deployment to police public gatherings contributed to the number of extrajudicial executions and unlawful killings. Since January, in response to the continued agitation by pro-Biafra campaigners, security forces

arbitrarily arrested and killed at least 100 members and supporters of the group **Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)**. Some of those arrested were subjected to enforced disappearance.

On 9 February, soldiers and police officers shot at about 200 **IPOB** members who had gathered for a prayer meeting at the National High School in Aba, in Abia state. Video footage showed soldiers shooting at peaceful and unarmed **IPOB** members; at least 17 people were killed and scores injured.

On 29 and 30 May, at least 60 people were killed in a joint security operation carried out by the army, police, Department of State Security (DSS) and navy. Pro-Biafra campaigners had gathered to celebrate Biafra Remembrance Day in Onitsha. No investigation into these killings had been initiated by the end of the year.

コ ●ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ [「ワールドレポート 2017—ナイジェリア」](#)  
(2017 年 1 月 12 日)

In February and May, security forces were accused of killing at least 40 members of **the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)**, and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). The groups are advocating for the separation of Biafra – mainly made up of Igbo-speaking people in the southeast – and the release of Nnamdi Kanu, the **IPOB** leader detained and undergoing trial for treason since October 2015.

[上記\(2\)イ](#)と同じ文書

サ ●アムネスティ・インターナショナル [「Nigeria: At least 150 peaceful pro-Biafra activists killed in chilling crackdown」](#) (2016 年 11 月 24 日)

Since August 2015, there has been a series of protests, marches and gatherings by members and supporters of **IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)** who have been seeking the creation of a Biafran state. Tensions increased further following the arrest of **IPOB** leader Nnamdi Kanu on 14 October 2015. He remains in detention.

**Extrajudicial executions**

By far the largest number of pro-Biafra activists were killed on Biafra Remembrance Day on 30 May 2016 when an estimated 1,000 **IPOB** members and supporters gathered for a rally in Onitsha, Anambra State. The night before the rally, the security forces raided homes and a church where **IPOB** members were sleeping.

シ ●カナダ移民難民局 (IRBC) [「\(クエリー回答\) Nigeria: Situation and treatment of members of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra \(MASSOB\), including arrest and prosecution; whether the Nigeria Police Force pursue people who use bribes to flee detention and who have no charges against](#)

**them (2013-July 2016)** (2016 年 7 月 20 日)

According to the US Department of State's Overseas Security Advisory Council's (OSAC) 2016 Crime and Safety Report for Nigeria, in 2015, members of IPOB and MASSOB held "several protests" in Nigeria (US 15 Apr. 2016, 4). The report states that "[t]he protests mainly centered on the arrest of the groups' leadership as well as their dissatisfaction with perceived inequality against the Igbo community" (ibid.). Sources indicate that the demonstrations began after Nigerian authorities arrested IPOB's leader Nnamdi Kanu (International Crisis Group 4 Dec. 2015; Senior Lecturer 15 July 2015) in October 2015, whom Madu's MASSOB faction supports (ibid.). According to the International Crisis Group, the protests involved "over 10,000 people in some cities" (4 Dec. 2015).

## ③ ビアフラ諸国民青年連盟 (BNYL)

ア ●記事「[ナイジェリア警察がビアフラのリーダーを釈放 \(Police release arrested Biafra leader\)](#)」New Telegraph (2018 年 1 月 27 日)

Princewill Obuka, the national Leader of Biafra Nations Youth League, BNYL, has been released from Police custody in Calabar, Cross River State after one week in detention.

Obuka and leader of displaced Bakassi youths Linus Essien were arrested along with their members in Ikingi Cameroon border following a tip-off operation on 16 Jan 2018, reasons for the arrest was not made public.

The group has been accused of plotting violence in the region following reports linking it to the violent outbreak in Cameroon which the group denied.

A statement released by its Deputy leader Ebuta Agbor Takon disclosed link with Cameroon separatist leaders.

## (2) ビアフラ権利活動家・支持者等の当局による取扱い

ア ●英国内務省「[国別情報ノート ナイジェリア：ビアフラ分離主義者、1.0 版](#)」(2020 年 4 月)

2.4.10 Arrests of IPOB, MASSOB and other pro-Biafran group members largely occur during demonstrations, anniversary celebrations and marches. In general there is limited evidence to demonstrate that arrests have led to prosecutions or convictions despite IPOB being proscribed. There are reports that some of those arrested have been charged with treason which is punishable with the death penalty but sources do not indicate whether these cases have then been prosecuted and convicted for treason or other crimes. Others have faced arrest for suspected membership (see Arbitrary arrest and detention and Prosecutions and convictions).



2.4.11 In general, low rank supporters or sympathisers of IPOB, MASSOB and smaller pro-Biafran groups are unlikely to be of interest to the government for that reason alone. However, the risk of arbitrary arrest, discrimination, violence and harassment by security forces is increased during demonstrations or gatherings, protest activity or participation in the annual Biafra Remembrance Day events (see Killings, discriminations, violence and harassment).

...

2.4.14 The government has a legal duty to protect the ‘indivisible and indissoluble sovereign state’ of Nigeria and maintain law and order. While MASSOB and IPOB have generally acted peacefully in advocating for an independent ‘Biafra’, the groups have also used inflammatory rhetoric, including comments in support of violence, and clashed with the authorities during demonstrations and protests. Therefore, the government and its agents, including the security forces, are likely to have a legitimate rationale in acting against the Biafran separatist groups where they pose a threat to the unitary state of Nigeria and law and order (see State treatment of separatist groups / supporters).

...

2.4.16 The government’s aim of targeting members or supporters of Biafran groups who advocate violence generally and participate in demonstrations which lead to violence or disrupt public order are likely to be legitimate acts of prosecution. However, where the government has arrested and detained persons who, for example, peacefully participate in demonstrations and has then charged them with treason or the person is subject to long periods of detention in degrading or inhuman conditions, such treatment is likely to be discriminatory and disproportionate, and amount to persecution.

イ ● アムネスティ・インターナショナル [「年次報告 2017/2018 年—ナイジェリア」](#) (2018 年 2 月 22 日)

Torture and other ill-treatment and unlawful detention by the police and the State Security Service (SSS) continued. In February, Nonso Diobu and eight other men were arrested and detained by Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) officers in Awkuzu, Anambra state. They were tortured and all, except Nonso Diobu, died in custody. Nonso Diobu was charged with robbery and released four months after arrest.

ウ ● 記事 [「Nigeria President Muhammadu Buhari Orders Military to Crush Insurgents But Biafra Separatists Vow to Fight On」](#) Newsweek (2017 年 8 月 23 日)

In his first major speech after returning, Buhari said he was concerned by Nigerians who have “crossed our national red lines by daring to question our collective existence as

a nation” and warned that threats to Nigeria’s unity would not be tolerated.

“Nigeria’s unity is settled and not negotiable. We shall not allow irresponsible elements to start trouble, and when things get bad they run away and saddle others with the responsibility of bringing back order, if necessary with their blood,” said Buhari.

エ ●記事 [「Nigeria's Igbo leaders reject call for Biafra state」](#) BBC (2017 年 7 月 3 日)

Security forces have killed at least 150 people since August 2015 to quell pro-independence protests, Amnesty International says.

The campaign has also fuelled tension in northern Nigeria, where some youth groups have retaliated by threatening to expel Igbos who live there.

オ ●アムネスティ・インターナショナル [「Nigeria: At least 150 peaceful pro-Biafra activists killed in chilling crackdown」](#) (2016 年 11 月 24 日)

Analysis of 87 videos, 122 photographs and 146 eye witness testimonies relating to demonstrations and other gatherings between August 2015 and August 2016 consistently shows that the military fired live ammunition with little or no warning to disperse crowds. It also finds evidence of mass extrajudicial executions by security forces, including at least 60 people shot dead in the space of two days in connection with events to mark Biafra Remembrance Day.

(3) ビアフラ権利活動家・支持者等の南東部地域外での状況

ア ●国連人権高等弁務官事務所 [「Nigeria: UN experts denounce ultimatum and death threats targeting Igbo minority」](#) (2017 年 8 月 25 日)

An ultimatum telling Nigeria’s Igbo minority in the north of the country to flee their homes is of “grave concern”, a group of United Nations human rights experts\* has warned.

The experts also deplored a hate song and audio message being circulated on the internet and on social media. The Hausa-language audio message urges northern Nigerians to destroy the property of Igbo people and kill anyone who refuses to leave by 1 October, the same date given in the ultimatum.

...

The ultimatum was issued on 6 June 2017 during a press briefing by the Arewa Youth Consultative Forum in the city of Kaduna. It called for sustained and coordinated campaigns to remove the Igbo population from the northern region.

(4) デルタ地域における平和的な政治活動

## ① MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People)

- ア ●マイノリティ・ライツ・グループ・インターナショナル (MRGI) [「マイノリティ/先住民世界要覧 - ナイジェリア:デルタ地域のマイノリティ集団」](#) (2018 年 1 月)

The Ogoni, who live in the north-eastern fringes of the Delta, began a campaign calling for the cleanup of environmental damage, greater revenue from oil production and political autonomy. Their Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) issued an Ogoni Bill of Rights, which demanded immediate compensation for ecological damage from Shell and self-determination for Ogoniland. MOSOP was originally an umbrella organization that united traditional chiefs and intellectuals, such as writer, entrepreneur and former cabinet minister of Rivers State Ken Saro-Wiwa. It came under severe pressure from the military government, and its leaders were detained and harassed.

## 4. ジェンダー、DV および子ども

## (5) 女性の国内避難の選択可能性

- ア ●NDP Item 5.28 ([2019 年 5 月 8 日付け IRBC 決定](#)で引用)

[20] Item 5.28 in the NDP indicates that about 45% of Igbo women have undergone FGM. One source indicates that “FGM is not prevalent in Lagos at all.” Residents of Lagos can refuse FGM. “Lagos is the most modernized and the most legally developed state in Nigeria” FGM in Lagos State is dying out. There has been a drastic reduction of FGM in Nigeria, and much more in Lagos. Another source indicates that the Edo (Igbo) have been in Lagos since the seventeenth century and have developed strong socio-cultural ties between Edo and Lagos. The source states that “any ritual practice for an Edo person should normally occur in Edo state, not in Lagos.” The level of risk is generally contingent on one’s proximity to one’s home community in Edo. Children are not compelled to take part in FGM procedures and the procedure was made illegal in Edo state in 1999. Notwithstanding this, social and cultural support for the practice continues, and some families still attempt to enforce this custom, whether inside Edo or elsewhere. The RPD considered this document and correctly interpreted and applied it. In light of the country-condition documentation, I agree with the RPD that there is not a serious possibility that members of the Igbo community at large would attempt to abduct and forcibly circumcise the two female minor Appellants in Lagos because of their cultural values.

## 5. LGBT

## (1) LGBT に関する国家当局による取扱い

## ① 法的な枠組み

- ア ●記事 [「Nigerian President Signs Ban on Same-Sex Relationship」](#) NYT (2014 年 1 月 13 日)

A tough ban on same-sex relationships that threatens violators with 14-year prison terms has been quietly signed into law by the president of Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation, a step that rights advocates have long feared not only as a repression aimed at gays but as an affront to basic freedoms of speech and assembly.

...

Under the Nigerian law, it is illegal not only to engage in an intimate relationship with a member of the same sex, but to attend or organize a meeting of gays, or patronize or operate any type of gay organization, including private clubs. Any same-sex marriages or partnerships accepted as legal in other countries would be void in Nigeria.

イ ●記事「[Nigeria Tries to 'Sanitize' Itself of Gay](#)」NYT (2014 年 2 月 8 日)

Since Nigeria's president, Goodluck Jonathan, signed a harsh law criminalizing homosexuality throughout the country last month, arrests of gay people have multiplied, advocates have been forced to go underground, some people fearful of the law have sought asylum overseas and news media demands for a crackdown have flourished.

Gay sex has been illegal in Nigeria since British colonial rule, but convictions were rare in the south and only occasional in the mostly Muslim north. The new law bans same-sex marriage and goes significantly further, prescribing 10 years in prison for those who "directly or indirectly" make a "public show" of same-sex relationships. It also punishes anyone who participates in gay clubs and organizations, or who simply supports them, leading to broad international criticism of the sweep of the law.

ウ 米国国務省「[人権状況に関する国別報告 2016 年 ナイジェリア \(仮訳\)](#)」(2017 年 3 月 3 日)

北部 12 州のシャリア裁判所は、鞭打ち、身体切断及び投石による死刑などの処罰を規定することができる。シャリア刑事訴訟法では、身体切断又は死刑を伴う判決を上級シャリア裁判所に上訴するための期間を 30 日間、被告人に与えている。制定法では州知事に対し、あらゆる裁判所判決を、身体切断又は死刑の量刑を含め、シャリア裁判所又は非シャリア裁判所のどちらによる判決かを問わず、平等に扱うことを義務付けている。しかし、当局はシャリア裁判所から下された鞭打ち、身体切断及び投石の量刑を実行しないことが多く、これは被告人が頻繁に上訴し、手続が長期間に及ぶ可能性があるためであった。連邦上訴裁判所は上記のような処罰が憲法違反に当たるか否かについて裁定を下していなかったが、これは連邦レベルに達する関連訴訟がなかったためである。シャリア上訴裁判所は一貫して、手続又は証拠に基づいて投石及び身体切断の量刑を覆したが、憲法を根拠とする異議申し立てはなかった。

## ② 法律の運用

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2018 - ナイジェリア」](#) (2018 年 1 月 18 日)**Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity**

The passage of the Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act (SSMPA) in January 2014 effectively authorized abuses against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community in 2017. The law has undermined freedom of expression for members of the LGBT community, human rights organizations, and others. In July, authorities arrested over 40 men attending an HIV awareness event at a hotel in Lagos and accused them of performing same-sex acts, a crime that carries up to 14 years in jail. In April, 53 men were arrested for celebrating a gay wedding, and charged with "belonging to a gang of unlawful society."

In addition to the SSMPA, under the Nigeria Criminal Code Act of 1990, "carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature" carries a maximum sentence of 14 years in prison. The Sharia penal code adopted by several northern Nigerian states prohibits and punishes sexual relations between persons of the same sex, with the maximum penalty for men being death by stoning, and whipping and/or imprisonment for women.

イ ●アムネスティ・インターナショナル [「AI レポート 2017 年/2018 年 - ナイジェリア」](#) (2018 年 2 月 22 日)**RIGHTS OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX PEOPLE**

Arrest, public shaming, extortion of and discrimination against individuals based on their sexual orientation were reported in several parts of the country. In April, the Nigerian police arraigned 53 men in a magistrate court in Zaria, Kaduna state, for conspiracy and unlawful assembly and for belonging to an unlawful society. They were accused of attending a gay wedding and granted bail.

In August, about 42 men and boys between 12 and 28 years old were arrested at a hotel in Lagos while attending an HIV intervention programme organized by an NGO. They were charged with "engaging in gay activities". The police paraded the victims to the media.

ウ ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ (HRW) [「“Tell Me Where I Can Be Safe”: The Impact of Nigeria’s Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act」](#) (2016 年 10 月)

## ③ 国家保護

- ア ●HRW [「“Tell Me Where I Can Be Safe”: The Impact of Nigeria’s Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act](#) (2016 年 10 月) [ARC&DCR 「EASO 出身国情報レポート - ナイジェリア (2017 年 6 月) に関する ARC・DCR のコメント」 (2017 年 11 月 7 日) で引用]

[...] III. Police Abuse of LGBT People [...]

LGBT people are fearful of arrest and imprisonment on the basis of their real or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity and many interviewees reported a new and profound fear of extortion, violence, and abuse at the hands of the police [...]

IV. A Climate of Fear [...]

Fear of Reporting Crimes [...]

Hazel, the representative of an LBT organization in Cross River State told Human Rights Watch that she was aware of cases where lesbians in particular did not report sexual assault to the police.<sup>101</sup> Reluctance to report sexual abuse is especially true for lesbian and bisexual women, who are not only more vulnerable to physical and sexual violence, but also less likely to report abuses than other members of the LGBT community [...]

Michael and many other interviewees said people who intend to perpetrate homophobic violence seem to have been lying low, but now that the widely publicized SSMPA was passed, they believe they can unleash terror, and the victims will be terrified of reporting to the police due to the “threat of 14 years in prison.” [...]

## 6. 汚職、非国家主体による犯罪、国家による被害者の保護

### (1) 非国家主体の迫害主体 - ボコ・ハラム

#### ① ボコ・ハラムの組織等

- ア 島田周平 [「時事解説：ボコハラムの過激化の軌跡」](#) ジェトロ・アジア経済研究所『アフリカレポート』(2014 年)

ボコハラム (Boko Haram) とは「西洋式教育は罪」という意味で、ナイジェリア北東部を主な活動の舞台とする過激なイスラーム原理主義団体の俗称である。彼らは自らを、“Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad (神の思し召しと聖戦の教えに帰依する信徒集団)”と呼んでいる [Walker 2012, 8]。

…ボコハラムの運動は 15 年間の軍政 (1984～1999 年) が終わった後に起きた。…1980 年代の構造調整計画実施後に進んできた急速な市場の自由化や西欧教育指向に対する反発が原動力となった。いずれも軍事政権の抑圧が取り払われた後の民政時代に入って過激なイスラーム原理主義運動となってきた。

…

ボコハラムの攻撃対象は、2011 年までは主に政府機関であった。外国人の誘拐や殺害が急速に増加してきたのは、ジョナサン大統領がボコハラムをテロ集団と呼び、彼らの一部が政府上層部にまで浸透していることを示唆した 2012 年以降の



ことである。

…ジョナサン大統領は、2013 年 5 月にテロリズム防止法 (Terrorism (Prevention) Act : 以後「テロ法」) を改定した。そして直ちにその翌月、ボコハラムとアンサル (Ansaru) をテロリスト集団と認定した。

## ② 標的に対する攻撃

### ア UNHCR 「[ナイジェリア北東部 \(ボルノ州・ヨベ州・アダマワ州\) および周辺地域から避難する人々の国際保護の必要性について 更新 I](#)」(2014 年 10 月)

2. 北東部における村落、市場、病院および学校を対象とした反政府勢力の攻撃は増しており、それらの攻撃によって多くの人々が避難を余儀なくされているという報告がある 8。

また、これらの攻撃は橋、民家、村落全体などを破壊し、一般市民の生活基盤に多大な損害を与えている 9。反政府組織はナイジェリア北東部の村落および市街地を掌握したと伝えられており、これらの中にはボルノ州グウォーザ、バマおよびバンキ、ヨベ州バラ、ならびに アダマワ州ミチカ、マダガリおよびガラックが含まれている 10。

### イ UNHCR 「[ナイジェリア北東部 \(ボルノ州・ヨベ州・アダマワ州\) および周辺地域から避難する人々の国際保護の必要性について 更新 II \(仮訳\)](#)」(2013 年 10 月)

…報道によると、反政府勢力は政府施設、特に学校を攻撃目標としており、これは反政府勢力がコーランに基づかない教育を非イスラム的とみなすことが原因であると言われている。学生や教師を含む多くの一般市民がそれらの攻撃により死傷したという報告がある 5。数万人もの学生が学校に通うことが出来ないと報道されている 6。…

## ③ 政府当局による民間人への攻撃

### ア UNHCR 「[ナイジェリア北東部 \(ボルノ州・ヨベ州・アダマワ州\) および周辺地域から避難する人々の国際保護の必要性について 更新 II \(仮訳\)](#)」(2013 年 10 月)

…反政府勢力と関わりがあると非難された何百人もの人々が、政府軍によって恣意的にナイジェリア北部に収容されているという報告がある。多くは起訴や裁判もなく、また弁護士や家族との連絡手段も無い状態で収容され、長期間音信不通になっている 7。

## (2) 一般的な国内避難選択の可能性

ア ●英国内務省「[出身国情報及びガイダンス ナイジェリア: 国内移住、第 1.0 版](#)」(2019 年 3 月)

**2.2 Internal relocation**

2.2.1 ...there are members of both religions throughout the country, while the major cities are a ‘fluid mix of different ethnicities and religions’ (see Geography).

2.2.2 Nigeria’s economy has grown in recent years and this has resulted in a significant increase in its value in the UN’s Human Development Index. However, around two-thirds of the population are poor / extremely poor, there are large inequalities in income and opportunity and many people work in informal or ‘grey’ economy. People in the north tend to be poorer than those in the south, while women tend to find it harder to find paid work and when they do it is often low paid. The government has developed some social protection programmes to reduce poverty and improve people’s lives. In addition there is an active civil society which provide a range of services. Food security is a problem for the poor and particularly those in ongoing civil conflict areas, such as the north-east (see Socio-economic conditions and Freedom of movement).

2.2.3 ...Non-indigenes – ‘settlers’ or persons not originally from the state they reside in – may face official and unofficial discrimination in accessing services in some states and may face difficulties in moving to another state without family connections or financial means (see Geography, Socio-economic conditions and Freedom of movement; and the country policy and information note, Nigeria: Medical and healthcare issues).

2.2.4 There are no legal constraints on movement within the country, however government-imposed curfews and insecurity in areas of civil conflict - the north-east; the ‘Middle Belt’; the Niger Delta region; and Zamfara state in particular - are likely to make travel difficult and unsafe in these parts of the country. Nonetheless, many Nigerians move within the country for economic and other reasons (see Freedom of movement).

**3.3 Ethnicity**

...

3.3.2 Freedom House observed that ‘[d]espite constitutional safeguards against ethnic discrimination, many ethnic minorities experience bias by state governments and other societal groups in areas including employment, education, and housing.’<sup>16</sup> ...

イ DFAT「[出身国情報報告 ナイジェリア \(仮訳\)](#)」(2018 年 3 月 9 日)

**非先住民**

...

3.8 ナイジェリアの全域に亘って、公的機関は個人に対し、公共サービスを利用

する前にその出身州又は先住性を明らかにするよう義務付けている。非先住民は財産の所有権に関して制限を受ける可能性があるという国内情報筋からの助言を DFAT は信頼できるものと考えている。連邦レベルでは、行政機関又は州立大学のポストに先住民枠が適用されることがある。非先住民は連邦、州又は地方自治体選挙で合法的に投票することができる。しかしながら、非先住民が州レベルで選出されるポジションに立候補することは極めて困難である。たとえば、カノ州の非先住民は議会選挙に立候補することはできない。

3.9 DFAT は、ラゴス及び連邦首都地区（アブジャ）を除き、全州が程度の差こそあれ、これらの慣行を実施していると理解している。…

## 宗教

…

3.12 キリスト教は南部のイボ族とヨルバ族の間で主要な宗教となっており、イスラム教は北部のハウサ/フラニ族とカヌリ族の主要な宗教である。オブザーバーの多くは引き続き、歴史的に南部がキリスト教徒、北部がイスラム教徒という区分をしているが、この区分は明確なものではないと国内情報筋は主張している。北部の諸州では主にハウサ/フラニ族とカヌリ族から成るイスラム教徒が多数派を占めており、南部では主にイボ族とヨルバ族から成るキリスト教徒が多数派を占めている。しかしながら、多くのキリスト教徒が北部の諸州にも住み、イスラム教徒が南部の諸州にも住んでいる。また、ミドル・ベルト地帯では様々な民族から成るイスラム教徒とキリスト教徒が共存しており、主要都市では様々な民族と宗教が流動的に混在している。

## 国内移住

5.21 ナイジェリアでは国内移住に対する法的障害は一切ない。移動の自由はナイジェリア憲法で規定されている基本的権利の一つである。

## 7. 兵役、強制徴集（非国家主体の）

## 8. 司法制度・刑事手続

### (1) 法律の制定と運用

ア ●アムネスティ・インターナショナル「[年次報告 2017 年／2018 年—ナイジェリア](#)」（2018 年 2 月 22 日）

In September, the Nigerian police launched Force Order 20 which sought to reduce the excessive use of pre-trial detention by providing free legal advice to suspects at police stations. In December, the Anti-Torture Bill – intended to prohibit and criminalize the use

of torture – was signed into law.

イ ●ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ「[ワールドレポート 2018—ナイジェリア](#)」  
(2018 年 1 月 18 日)

The director of defense information announced in August that the military would monitor social media for "hate speech, anti-government and anti-security information." The government also directed the National Broadcasting Commission to sanction any radio or television station that broadcasts hate speech. It threatened to charge people found to spread yet-to-be defined hate speech under the Terrorism Prevention Act.

9. 警察および治安部隊による人権侵害（刑務所等の状況含む）

10. 報道の自由

11. 宗教の自由

(1) キリスト教徒

① 北部地域での危害のおそれ

ア DFAT「[出身国情報報告 ナイジェリア（仮訳）](#)」（2018 年 3 月 9 日）

ボコハラム—キリスト教徒及びイスラム教徒

3.14 キリスト教徒、イスラム教徒とも、その宗教的信条を理由にボコハラムの手による暴力を受けてきた。ボコハラムはキリスト教の他、制約がそれほどない形態のイスラム教にも反対している。ボコハラムはキリスト教徒コミュニティよりも頻繁にイスラム教徒コミュニティを襲撃しており、また、イスラム教徒を誘拐し、暗殺したという国内外の情報筋の報告を信憑性のあるものであると考えている。キリスト教徒が個々に標的とされるケースはそれほど一般的でない。

...

② 南部地域での危害のおそれ

ア ●IRBC「[\(IRBC クエリー回答\) Nigeria: The capacity of Boko Haram to pursue individuals who relocate to another region or city, such as Lagos \(2013-March 2016\)](#)」(2016 年 3 月 11 日)

I suspect that the group's reach is probably weak in the Southern parts of the country mainly because (1) the South is predominately Christian; (2) the South is predominantly Igbo (the Hausa and Fulani, which are largely Muslim, dominate northern Nigeria); (3) it is not easy for one ethnic group to move to another region, as they would stick out (they would not speak the local languages, know the local customs, etc.). The princip[al] ethnic group in

Lagos are Yoruba, and there are Christian and Muslim Yorubas. (Assistant Professor 7 Mar. 2016)

The CFR representative stated that Boko Haram is "almost entirely inactive in Lagos" (CFR 1 Mar. 2016) and has "only carried out a single operation" there (ibid. 9 Mar. 2016). The CRS specialist reported that recent Boko Haram activity in the South consisted of an attack on a fuel depot in Lagos in June 2014, and a "few isolated incidents" in 2015 between the police and alleged Boko Haram members in Akwa Ibom and Ebonyi (US 1 Mar. 2016).<sup>[8]</sup>

イ [前記 6\(2\)「一般的な国内避難選択の可能性」](#)を参照

## 12. 国籍、民族および人種

### (1) デルタ地域のマイノリティ集団

ア [マイノリティ・ライツ・グループ・インターナショナル \(MRGI\)「マイノリティ／先住民世界要覧 - ナイジェリア：デルタ地域のマイノリティ集団」](#) (2018 年 1 月)

…Delta minority groups include Andoni, Brass, Dioubu, Etche, Ijaw, Kalibari, Nembe, Ogoni and Okrika.

The Niger Delta is the main oil-producing region of Nigeria, which is the largest oil producer in Africa and produces one-tenth of the world's crude oil. Nigeria's 1999 Constitution gives the central government ownership of the country's natural resources; the Nigerian federal government is the prime beneficiary of the revenue earned from selling the crude oil abroad. However, a large portion of the revenue is routinely lost to corruption. As a result little of the wealth created by oil is distributed within the Niger Delta, or to the Nigerian people as a whole. ...

### (2) イボ族

イ ● [マイノリティ・ライツ・グループ・インターナショナル \(MRGI\)「マイノリティ／先住民世界要覧 - ナイジェリア：イボ族」](#) (2018 年 1 月)

Igbo make up around 18 per cent of Nigeria's population. Their traditional homeland straddles the Niger River in the south-east and is one of the most densely populated areas of the African continent. Igbo are predominantly Christian. Traditionally, Igbo were subsistence farmers of yams, taro and cassava. Today many are well educated and work as civil servants and in business. Over a period of many years, over 1 million Igbo have migrated to other parts of Nigeria.

ウ [玉井隆「時事解説：2015 年ナイジェリア選挙」](#) ジェトロ・アジア経済研究所『アフリカレポート』53 号 (2015 年)

…今回の大統領選挙において、南東部地域の各州では全てジョナサン が勝利したという点である。そもそもジョナサンは南南部地域出身であり、また PDP は南東部地域に強い支持基盤を持っていた。それに対してブハリは北部出身であり、またオシンバジヨは南西部地域出身である。このことから、今回の選挙でブハリが勝利した場合、南東部地域の人びとが、これまで以上にナイジェリア国内政治から見放されることを恐れたと考えられる。過去を振り返ってみても、1967～70年のビアフラ戦争以降、ブハリが軍事政権のトップにいた 1983～85 年を含め、南東部地域の人びとは連邦政府に冷遇され、特に石油採掘地域の人びとは今もなお深刻な環境汚染と貧困に苦しんでいる。…

### ③ イボ地域以外に居住するイボ族の状況

#### ア DFAT「[出身国情報報告 ナイジェリア \(仮訳\)](#)」(2018 年 3 月 9 日)

3.5 イボ族はナイジェリアのミドル・ベルト地帯と北部の諸州でボコハラムからの襲撃に直面してきた。2011 年 1 月、イボ族の 40 人は、乗車していたバスがプラトー州ジョス市内のイスラム教徒が圧倒的多数を占める地域に入った後、車外に連れ去られ、殺害された。2011 年 11 月、中部及び北部のプラトー州、カドゥナ州、ナサラワ州、ナイジャ州及びボルノ州のイボ族住民は、ボコハラムの襲撃に対応して南部に避難した。しかしながら、イボ族がその民族性を理由として特別に標的にされたという報告は最近行われていない。過去の襲撃は機に乗じたものであり、散発的で、稀にしか行われなかった。イボ族はナイジェリアで日常ベースでの社会的暴力に直面していないと DFAT は評価している。

### 13. 出入国および移動の自由

### 14. 国籍／市民権 (パスポートを所持していない者の)

### 15. その他